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CHAPTER 4 
Article Three: Commercial Paper 
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND 
§4.1. Repeals and revisions generally. Section 2 of Chapter 765 ot 
the Massachusetts Acts and Resolves of 1957 repeals all but a few 
sections of the old Chapter 107, "Money and Negotiable Instruments." 
Still left standing are Section I, "Money of Account"; Section 2, "Ac-
counts etc. expressed in other Monies"; Section 3, "Rate of Interest"; 
Section 4, "Issue of Registered Bonds"; Section 7, "Bonds etc. Redeem-
able in Numerical Order, etc. Not to be Issued"; Section 8, "Penalties" 
(for violations of the preceding section); Section 10, "Damages on 
Other Contracts"; Section 13, "Protest Prima Facie Evidence"; and 
Section 45-A, "Use of Facsimile Signatures on Checks by Treasurers of 
Public Bodies." Only these sections survive the repealer clause in the 
new legislation of 1957; they formed no part of the Uniform Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, which on October I, 1958, will be replaced by 
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
The Massachusetts uniform enumeration of the sections of the new 
Code, which conforms with that of Pennsylvania and of the 1957 
Official Edition published by the sponsors, will substantially aid the 
lawyer studying some problem. The facilitation of comparative re-
search thus achieved will increase as other states adopt the Code with 
the same uniform enumeration. The brief-writer need no longer be 
irritated and delayed by finding, for example, a holder in due course 
defined by Section 75 of Chapter 107 of the Massachusetts General 
Laws, but by Section 91 of the New York Negotiable Instruments Law, 
and by Section 52 of the Uniform NIL. 
Article 3 of the new Code will not work any revolutionary changes 
in the Massachusetts law of negotiable paper. Chapter 107 of the 
General Laws has proved reasonably convenient and clear; litigation 
under it has become comparatively infrequent. There was no need for 
drastic change; correction of certain anomalies and inconsistencies 
which had inadvertently been included in the old Uniform NIL, or 
which had become apparent as customs of doing business had changed 
with the years, was the only requirement. Such comparatively modest 
reforms have been accomplished; the new Article is a businesslike and 
ARTHUR E. SUTHERLAND is Bussey Professor of Law at the Harvard Law School. 
He was coordinator (with Robert Braucher) of the 1956 Revision of the Uniform 
Commercial Code. He participated in formulating the Massachusetts Annotations to 
the Uniform Commercial Code. 
1
Sutherland: Chapter 4: Article Three: Commercial Paper
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1957
§4.3 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ART. 3 25 
easily understood statute, which should serve still further to reduce 
the areas of uncertainty in the law of negotiable instruments, and 
should render litigation even more infrequent. 
An attempt to enumerate here every minor change made by Article 
3 would be tedious to the reader and serve little purpose. The Special 
Supplement to the Annotated Laws of Massachusetts, New Chapter 109 
(1958) will better accomplish that end. These notes will describe only 
what appear to be the more conspicuous amendments which Article 3 
introduces. 
§4.2. "Investment securities": Negotiability of Massachusetts trust 
obligations. One change made by Article 3 does perhaps deserve to 
be called a drastic departure from the old NIL. This is the transfer 
to a separate Article - Article 8 - of the entire subject of bearer bonds 
and any similar obligation "of a type commonly dealt in upon securities 
exchanges or markets or commonly recognized in any area in which it 
is issued or dealt in as a medium for investment ... " 1 The policy 
considerations affecting such "investment securities" are quite different 
from those covering ordinary commercial paper - checks, notes, trade 
acceptances, and so on. The effort to make the Negotiable Instruments 
Law cover both types has on occasion produced strained constructions 2 
which Article 8 will render unnecessary. 
A question has sometimes been asked about the negotiability of 
obligations of a "Massachusetts trust." Under the provision of G.L., c. 
107, §25, "an order or promise to pay only out of a particular fund is 
not unconditional" 3 and an instrument containing such a qualified 
promise is not negotiable. Section 3-105 (1) (h) of the Code provides 
that an obligation is not made conditional by the fact that "A promise 
or order otherwise unconditional ... is limited to payment out of the 
entire assets of a partnership, unincorporated association, trust or 
estate by or on behalf of which the instrument is issued." 4 Any obli-
gations of a Massachusetts trust not governed by Article 8 as "invest-
ment securities" will under Article 3 clearly not be deprived of nego-
tiability merely because the holder can only have recourse to trust 
assets. 
§4.3. Restrictive endorsements. Under G.L., c. 107, §§59, 60 and 
70,1 a restrictive endorsement deprived the instrument of negotiability. 
The necessities of bank collection require that checks be handled 
rapidly in great numbers; intermediary and payor banks have no real 
opportunity to scrutinize endorsements; under the NIL liability for 
handling a restrictively endorsed check may thus rest on a bank which 
has no effective way to protect itself. See, as an example, the 1938 
§4.2. 1 uee §8-102 (1) (a) (ii). 
2 See, for example, Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928). 
3 NIL §3. 
4 uce §3·105(1)(h). 
§4.3. 1 NIL §§36, 37, 47. 
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opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Soma v. Handrulis.2 The 
remedy is not, however, simple elimination of the effect of restrictive 
endorsements; this would also produce injustices; people are used to 
writing "For Deposit" or similar directions on the backs of instruments, 
intending thus to put them beyond successful theft. The Code had to 
reach a compromise between these extremes, and this was accomplished 
by a series of changes,3 appearing in Sections 3-102, 3-205, 3-206, 3-304, 
3-419, 3-603, and, in Article 4, Sections 4-203 and 4-205. 
The effect of Section 3-206 and the associated sections is to give to 
the instrument endorsed "for collection," "for deposit," "pay any 
bank," or the like, complete negotiability in bank-collection channels, 
except in the hands of the first bank to handle the paper; but to retain 
liability against the first bank and all others who may fail to payor 
apply consistently with the endorsement. The owner of a check who so 
endorses it thus has at least one financially reliable party - the first 
bank recipient - to hold liable for misuse of the instrument. Trust 
endorsements are treated more leniently by Section 3-206 (4) of the 
Code; a trustee-holder to carry out his functions must be able to 
realize on trust assets by negotiating to any bona fide purchaser in-
struments endorsed to him in trust, and thereby to make any such 
transferee a holder in due course. Section 3-206 (4) accomplishes this. 
§4.4. "Once bearer paper, always bearer paper"? Order paper 
may, of course, be endorsed simply with the payee's name without 
additional words (blank endorsement); or it may be endorsed by the 
the payee to some other named person (special endorsement). Where 
order paper bears first a blank endorsement, and then a special en-
dorsement, the Massachusetts rule appears to be that the blank en-
dorsement permanently characterizes the instrument, which forever 
thereafter is bearer paper even if it bears later special endorsements.! 
The Code changes this rule by making the last endorsement of "any 
instrument" control.2 Thus under the Code an order instrument may 
be endorsed first in blank, thus becoming bearer paper by virtue of 
that endorsement; then to Jones or order, thus becoming order paper; 
next in blank again, becoming bearer paper anew, in an infinite series. 
2277 N.Y. 223, 14 N.E.2d 46 (1938). 
3 General Laws, c. 107 spells "endorsement" with an initial "e." The Uniform 
Commercial Code spells it "indorsement." After some hesitation the initial "e" 
was chosen for these brief commentaries. Whoever writes next year's ANNUAL 
SURVEY, when the old order will have changed, may well spell the word with an "i." 
§4.4. 1 Parker v. Roberts, 243 Mass. 174, 137 N.E. 295 (1922). This holding has 
been criticized on the ground that G.L., c. 107, §63, NIL §40, is inconslistent with 
G.L., c. 107, §31 (5), NIL §9 (5), and G.L. c. 107, §57, NIL §34; hence that G.L., c. 
107, §63 should be applied to instruments payable to bearer on their face which 
should remain bearer paper despite the form of any endorsement, but G.L., c. 107, 
§§31(5) and 57 should be applied to instruments originally made payable to order, 
on which the last endorsement should control. See Britton, Bills and Notes §64 
(1943). From this maze one turns with relief to §3-204 of the Code. 
II UCC §3-204. 
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§4.6 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ART. 3 27 
§4.5. Negligence contributing to alteration. From time to time 
a negotiable instrument (typically a check) is so carelessly drawn that 
a wrongdoer can easily raise it and obtain payment of it from the 
drawee, or can sell it to a holder in due course. Under the 1827 
English rule of Young v. Grote} the drawee was allowed to charge 
the negligent drawer's account for the instrument as raised; but the 
drawer could set up the alteration as a defense against a holder in due 
course. General Laws, c. 107 had no provision on the point, but de-
cisionallaw in Massachusetts was the same.2 Section 3-406 of the Code 
will change the law as to holders in due course; the negligent drawer 
or maker will be precluded from setting up the alteration not only 
against a drawee who pays in good faith and in accordance with 
reasonable commercial standards, but also against a holder in due 
course. 
§4.6. Warranties to a payor. General Laws, c. 107, §§88 and 891 
provide respectively for warranties by one "negotiating" by delivery 
or qualified endorsement; and for warranties by an unqualified en-
dorser running "to all subsequent holders in due course." As the 
obtaining of payment is not "negotiation" and the payor, drawer or 
maker who pays the instrument does not become a "holder," 2 the 
weight of authority has held that one who in good faith obtains pay-
ment of an instrument from a drawee or maker gives to the payor no 
implied warranties.3 In banking practice this lack has been supplied 
by such stamped endorsements as "All previous endorsements guaran-
teed"; the Code (with exceptions to be noted) imposes warranties on 
all who obtain payment or acceptance of instruments. There are, 
however, no such warranties where the principle of Price v. Neal' 
applies; it is inappropriate for one acting in good faith to give war-
§4.5. 14 Bing. 253, 130 Eng. Rep. 764 (C.P. 1827). 
2 Greenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196 (1877); Cape Ann National 
Bank v. Burns, 129 Mass. 596 (1880), as to holders in due course. The Greenfield 
Savings Bank opinion suggests, obiter, at p. 202, that a drawer's negligence pro-
tects the drawee bank. See Annotation, 42 A.L.R.2d 1070 (1955). 
§4.6. 1 NIL §§65, 66. 
2 South Boston Trust Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 45, 143 N.E. 816 (1924); Hubbard 
Bros. & Co. v. Southern Pacific Co., 256 Fed. 761 (5th Cir. 1919). See Britton, Bills 
and Notes §139 (1943). 
3 Here should be pointed out another principle of law which, even in the 
absence of warranty by one who obtains payment of an instrument, may still render 
him liable to the payor. If the payor pays in reliance on a mistake of fact - for 
example in reliance of the genuineness of a chain of endorsements apparently carry-
ing good title to the last holder, whereas one endorsement is forged - the payor 
may be able to recover his money from the recipient. This was the situation in 
Carpenter v. Northborough National Bank, 123 Mass. 66 (1877), which upheld such 
a recovery. But if the party who presented the instrument to the payor was merely 
a collection agent, so known to be by the payor, the agent's liability ends when 
he pays over the collected sum to his principal. National Park Bank of New York 
v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N.Y. 28, 20 N.E. 632 (1889). See Britton, Bills and Notes 
§§139,140 (1943). 
43 Burr. 1354,97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). 
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ran ties to a payor who is himself chargeable with notice of the matters 
in question.1i Thus under the Code, even in the absence of a guar-
antee of previous endorsement, one who obtains payment of a draft 
from the person on which it is drawn warrants the genuineness of 
any endorsements through which he claims to hold. He does not, 
however, warrant the genuineness of the drawer's signature, which 
the drawee is bound to know.6 
§4.7. Presentment, notice of dishonor and protest. Section 3-501 
of the Code puts in one place a large number of provisions on these 
subjects, which are scattered through the NIL. There are only minor 
changes of substance. Protest is made unnecessary except on inter-
national drafts. Section 3-502 makes new law covering the situation 
(now happily almost nonexistent in banking) where a drawer main-
tains funds on deposit with a drawee, or payor bank, to meet his 
drafts, but the drawee, or payor bank, becomes insolvent during un-
reasonable delay in presentment by the payee or other holder. The 
Code does not thereby effect a discharge of the drawer of a check "to 
the extent of the loss caused," as was the case under G.L., c. 107, §209.1 
Section 3-502 now provides instead that any drawer, or the acceptor 
or maker of an instrument payable at a bank, under these circum-
stances obtains a discharge only on giving to the holder a written 
assignment of his rights against the drawee or payor bank. The 
"forced novation" so effected is the penalty of the holder for his delay 
in presentment. And for consistency, Section 3-502 applies the same 
rule to delay in notice of dishonor to any party other than an en-
dorser; the endorser is discharged as he always has been. 
Presentment of demand paper under G.L., c. 107, §§ 94 and 209 2 
must be made "within a reasonable time after its issue." Under Sec-
tion 3-503 (1) (e) of the Code, for purposes of determining the liability 
of secondary parties, presentment of demand paper is due within a 
reasonable time after the secondary party becomes liable thereon. 
Section 3-503 (2) sets up presumed reasonable periods of presentment or 
initiation of collection of an uncertified check (not drawn by a bank) 
drawn and payable within the United States" (a) with respect to the 
liability of the drawer, thirty days after date or issue whichever is 
later; and (b) with respect to the liability of an indorser, seven days 
after his indorsement." 3 This will give a longer time for presentment 
5 In Massachusetts, Price v. Neal is held to be law, not by judicial construction 
of G.L., c. 107, §85, NIL §62, but as a principle of the common law which was 
unaffected by the uniform statute. South Boston Trust Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 
45, 143 N.E. 816 (1924). Negligence by the presenting party has, however, per-
mitted the drawee to recover despite the rule of Price v. Neal. First National Bank 
of Danvers v. First National Bank of Salem, 151 Mass. 280, 24 N.E. 44 (1890). See 
Britton, Bills, and Notes §136 (1943). 
6 VCC §§3-417 (1),4-207(1) . 
§4.7. 1 NIL §186. 
2 NIL §§71 modified, 186. 
3 VCC §3·503(2)(a), (b) ... ~ 
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than is true under G.L., c. 107, § 94 4 in many cases, particularly where 
all parties live or do business in the same city.1I 
§4.8. The "jus tertii" as a defense. A troublesome question is 
raised when one liable on negotiable paper sets up as a defense the 
lack of proper title in the holder. The classic Massachusetts case is 
Prouty v. Roberts} which in 1850 disallowed to a maker a defense 
that the note was got from the payee by fraud. The question was 
considered by the Supreme Judicial Court in 1955 in Nichols v. 
Somerville Savings Bank.2 The drawer of a bank draft was sued on 
the draft by a real estate broker who had obtained the draft by en-
dorsement from the payee. The defendant drawer was allowed to set 
up as a defense the conditional delivery of the instrument by the 
payee to the plaintiff-endorsee. The defendant drawer had attempted 
to interplead the payee, one Ferretti, but the trial court had denied 
this motion. The Supreme Judicial Court's opinion says of this mat-
ter: "It seems unfortunate that the defendant's motion to interplead 
Ferretti was denied. See G.L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 231, § 40. Favorable action 
would have given an opportunity to do justice simultaneously among 
all the parties to the instrument." 3 
Section 3-306 of the Code provides: 
Unless he has the rights of a holder in due course any person 
takes the instrument subject to 
(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and 
(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an 
action on a simple contract; and 
(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-per-
formance of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for 
a special purpose (section 3-409); and 
(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds 
the instrument acquired it by theft, or that payment or satis-
faction to such holder would be inconsistent with the terms of 
a restrictive indorsement. The claim of any third person to the 
instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to any party 
liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the action 
for such party. 4 
If a Nichols case were to arise with the Code in force, one would 
suppose that under subparagraph (d) Ferretti, the payee of the bank 
draft, would be entitled as of right to defend the action for the Som-
erville Bank, and that if he did so, his rights against Nichols would 
be a defense as they were held to be in the actual case. 
4 NIL §7I modified. 
5 See Lowell Co-operative Bank v. Sheridan, 284 Mass. 594, 188 N.E. 636 (1933); 
Britton, Bills and Notes §§195, 199 (1943). 
§4.8. 16 Cush. 19 (Mass. 1850). 
2333 Mass. 488, 132 N.E.2d 158 (1956), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.4. 
3333 Mass. at 490, 132 N.E.2d at 159. 
4 uee §3-306. 
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Section 3-603 of the Code supports this analysis; the liability of 
a defendant drawer in the situation of the Nichols case would be dis-
charged under that section by payment to the holder, unless the payee 
supplied indemnity to the defendant drawer or obtained an injunction 
in a proceeding to which holder, drawer and payee were parties. 
Section 3-603 would thus inferentially sustain the defense if the payee 
did supply indemnity, and it would encourage the joinder of all three 
parties which the Nichols opinion suggests. 
§4.9. Rights of the irregular endorser who pays the holder. In 
Quimby v. Varnum? the Supreme Judicial Court in 1906 held that 
an irregular endorser who paid the instrument could not recover on it 
against the maker. This anomaly is corrected by Section 3-603 (2) 
of the Code. 
§4.10. 1957 Bills and Notes cases. There have been few reported 
bills and notes cases, in addition to those previously mentioned in 
this chapter, decided either in the federal courts for Massachusetts or 
the Supreme Judicial Court during the 1957 SURVEY year. In United 
States v. deVallet1 the opinion applies G.L., c. 107, § 39 (6): "Where 
a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in 
what capacity the person making the same intended to sign he is to be 
deemed an endorser," 2 and §86: "A person placing his signature upon 
an instrument otherwise than as maker, drawer or acceptor is deemed 
to be an endorser, unless he clearly indicates by appropriate words his 
intention to be bound in some other capacity." 3 
The District Court, in this suit brought against a bank by the 
United States to recover insurance the government had paid when an 
insured note was defaulted, held (as seems obvious) that a purported 
signature on the lower left of the face (which had been forged) was 
that of a "party," and thus that under a FHA regulation requiring 
that signatures of all "parties" must be genuine the government could 
recover the insurance it had paid. If the signature was not that of 
a co-maker, the purported signer was "at least an endorser" - though 
the signature appeared on the face of the note. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in A-Z Servicenter, Inc. v. Segall,4 
held that where a mortgage note, given for the purchase price of 
$20,000 for realty, stated that $41,400, comprising principal and in-
terest, was to be paid monthly over a period of fifteen years, and that 
in event of default the holder of the note had an option to declare the 
entire amount immediately due and payable as liquidated damages and 
not as a penalty, the acceleration provision of the note constituted a 
"penalty" and was not enforceable as to future interest. 
§4.9. 1190 Mass. 211, 76 N.E. 671 (1906). 
§4.l0. 1152 F. Supp. 313 (D. Mass. 1957). 
2 NIL §17 (6). 
sId. §63. 
4334 Mass. 672, 138 N.E.2d 266 (1956). 
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§4.10 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: ART. 3 31 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in Blender v. Epstein, II exemplified 
the usual rule that the parol evidence rule does not bar testimony 
on behalf of the defendant in an action brought by the party accom-
modated against the accommodation party, to show the latter's true 
character, and hence to defeat an action for contribution where the 
accommodated party has paid the instrument. Section 3-415 (3) and 
(5) of the Code restates this long-established principle of law. 
5334 Mass. 693, 138 N.E.2d 270 (1956). The action was brought by the adminis-
tratrix of the accommodated party; the principle is no different from that in an 
action by the party himself. 
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